Orthodox Study
Maximos the Confessor

anchors 371–380

Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice — translated by G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware

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94. A perfect man is one who by means of self-control fights against temptations subject to his will, and who endures with patience trials that are contrary to his wishes. And an entire man is one whose practice of the virtues is completed by spiritual knowledge, and whose contemplation does not remain without practical effect. [00372] 95. Since distress and pleasure each affect both the soul and the senses, he who cultivates the soul’s pleasure and patiently accepts the distress of the senses becomes tested, perfect and entire. He is tested by experiencing the contrasting effects of pleasure and distress in the senses. He becomes perfect because he fights unremittingly against pleasure and distress in the senses with self-control and patience. He becomes entire because, through constant obedience to the intelligence, he maintains the conditions that combat the mutually conflicting experiences of pleasure and distress in the senses. By these conditions I mean the practice of the virtues and contemplation, which he holds together without allowing the one to be in the least disjoined from the other: his actions manifest his contemplative knowledge and his-contemplation is protected equally by the intelligence and by the practice of the virtues. [00373] 96. He who has had experience of the distress and pleasure of the [00374] Third Century flesh may be described as tested because he has experienced both the pleasant and the unpleasant aspects of the flesh. A perfect man is one who with the power of his intelligence has struggled against the pleasure and pain of the flesh and has overcome them. An entire man is one who keeps both his practice of the virtues and his contemplative life unvarying through the intensity of his longing for God. [00375] 97. Distress of soul is of two kinds. The first is distress for one’s own sins; the second is distress for the sins of others. The cause of such distress is clearly the sensual pleasure either of the man who feels distress or of those about whom he is distressed. For strictly speaking there is scarcely ever any sin in man that is not first generated by the soul’s witless attachment to the senses for the sake of pleasure. And the cause of pleasure in a man’s soul is obviously the distress which he feels in his senses when he delights and rejoices in his own virtues or in those of others. For again strictly speaking there is scarcely any virtue in man unless it is first generated by the soul’s deliberate detachment from the senses. [00376] 98. When the soul is free of all impassioned attachment to the senses, there is no sin whatsoever in man. Moreover, all distress of soul is preceded by pleasure in the flesh. [00377] 99. The true origin of virtue lies in the soul’s voluntary estrangement from the flesh. And the person who subdues the flesh with voluntary sufferings imbues his soul with spiritual delight. [00378] 100. When the soul has achieved detachment from the senses for the sake of virtue, the senses will of necessity suffer, for the soul’s capacity for devising pleasure will no longer be conjoined with them in a deliberately chosen relationship. On the contrary, the soul will now bravely repulse the assaults of natural sensual pleasure with self-control; through patient endurance it will implacably resist the attacks of unnatural and involuntary suffering; it will not abandon the godlike dignity and glory of virtue for pleasure which has no real substance; and it will not fall from the heights of virtue in order to spare the flesh by relieving it of the sufferings induced by the pain of the senses. For the cause of distress in the senses is the soul’s complete concentration on what accords with nature; and the pleasure of the senses is clearly supported by whatever activity of the soul is contrary to nature, for such pleasure can have no principle of existence other than the soul’s rejection of what accords with nature. [00379] Fourth Century [00380] 1. The soul has an intellectual capacity that is purposeful and inventive. When this capacity is separated from its attachment to the senses, it no longer seeks to satisfy the longing of the flesh for pleasure, as it did previously by virtue of their deliberately chosen relationship. Since its entire attention and intention are now fixed on divine realities, it refuses to assuage the flesh’s suffering.

Translated by G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware. Edition opa.patristics.maximus-the-confessor.philokalia-various-texts-on-theology-divine-economy-and-virtue-and-vice.en.

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